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Abstract
The present paper, using a social interactions model, studies the
impact of culture on autonomy of immigrants. The results suggest
that: (i) immigrants’ autonomy is largely influenced by the auton-
omy of individuals living in a host country; (ii) some immigrants
are better off in countries and regions with better institutional en-
vironments. The results are robust to sensitivity checks. The con-
tributions of the paper are as follows. First, we estimate a social
interactions model that models both the formation of social interac-
tions and the sorting of individuals to study the impact of culture on
individual autonomy. Second, we estimate a model that analyzes the
impact of both confidence in the individual and collective culture on
individuals’ decisions. Finally, since this is an observational learning
model, policy suggestions may be drawn from the analysis.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work by Banfield (1958), the interest of economists on
the impact of culture on the functioning of economic systems has grown
steadily (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2012, for a survey of the liter-
ature). Culture may be regarded as a particular type of intangible public
good that combines together a bundle of personal traits and individual val-
ues shared by those individuals belonging to a specific geographic, religious
or ethnic group. Examples of personal traits and individual values that are
expected to affect economic outcomes are honesty, morality, attitudes to-
ward religion and social justice, openness to strangers, willingness to work
hard and the recognition of the importance of family ties (Barro and Mc-
Cleary, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Tabellini, 2010; Algan
and Cahuc, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
If cultural traits and values affect economic outcomes, an important
question is to examine how they emerge in a community of individuals.
Evolutionary models of cultural transmission point out that culture can be
either originated from simultaneous social interactions - horizontal trans-
mission - or inherited from earlier generations - vertical transmission -
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Bisin and Verdier, 2011). Therefore,
culture is seen as the result of an historical component, made of habits and
values received from parents and earlier generations, as well as of a simul-
taneous component, represented by beliefs generated by social interactions
and informal networking.
In this paper we select a specific cultural trait that is likely to affect
economic outcomes and investigate whether people who have moved from
one regional context to another either conform or resist to the prevailing
trait existing in the place of destination. This behavioral choice is not
neutral for the prosperity of a society since there are some cultural values
that are more likely to lead towards economic progress and others that
are expected to be more conducive towards economic decline (Alesina and
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Giuliano, 2015). Thus, investigating how such behavioral choices emerge
sheds light on our understanding of the impact of culture on economic
outcomes.
The cultural trait we focus on in this study is the extent to which in-
dividuals believe that life outcomes depend on their effort and choices. A
large body of work points out that individuals who view economic suc-
cess as related to their own deliberate decisions are more likely to work
hard, innovate and undertake new economic initiatives (Tabellini, 2010;
Phelps, 2013). These individuals, therefore, are more likely to display en-
trepreneurial attitudes, start up new businesses, and generate economic
prosperity and growth (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011). To capture the
extent to which individuals believe to be masters of their own life we refer to
a recent line of research that examines the relationship between individuals
autonomous behavior and economic outcomes such as income mobility and
welfare spending, entrepreneurship and subjective well-being (Bavetta and
Navarra, 2012; Bavetta, Maimone and Navarra, 2014).
To investigate whether and the extent to which individuals, moving
from one place to another, either conform or resist to the level of individual
autonomy prevailing in the destination community, we observe the behavior
of immigrants. Individuals who moved from one geographical region to
another, face the choice of whether to live according to the beliefs and
values shared by the people living in the new destination or to stick with
their own cultural traits.
To examine the dynamics through which cultural traits either are or
are not transmitted in society from the indigenous population to immi-
grants, we construct a social interactions model in which individuals make
three sequential decisions. First, they decide whether they want to migrate.
Second, they choose the place where they want to go. Third, they decide
whether to conform to the prevailing degree of autonomy in decision-making
existing in the place where they have chosen to migrate. The destination
regions where individuals decide to migrate are grouped in two different
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sets of countries according to their level of either political or economic free-
dom. This choice responds to the fact that the exercise of autonomous
behavior requires institutional environments in which constraints to indi-
vidual choices ought to be limited (Sen, 1999; Bavetta and Guala, 2003).
Therefore, the greater (smaller) the extent of either economic or political
freedom existing in a given country, the wider (narrower) the set of choices
open to individuals in that country and the larger (smaller) the scope for the
exercise of autonomous behavior (Bavetta, Maimone and Navarra, 2014).
We further investigate the transmission of autonomous attitudes com-
paring the behavior of individuals moving to regions located in two different
geographical areas that are characterized by different attitudes towards in-
dividual responsibility and self-governance in life: the United States (US)
and Europe (EU). There is an extensive literature in economics that ex-
plains the different levels of welfare spending in the US and Europe on the
basis of different beliefs that individuals have in considering achievements
in life as the outcome of their own effort and commitment (Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Therefore, we perform a further
analysis by grouping regional destinations of immigrants in two categories:
US and EU regions.
To carry out the empirical analysis we adopt the theoretical framework
in which individuals’ behavioral decisions are driven by their own expecta-
tions about the average behavior shared by other people in society (Brock
and Durlauf, 2006; Blume et al., 2011). Therefore, our analysis allows us to
provide theory-driven evidence on the impact of collective cultural beliefs
on individual beliefs through social interactions.
We use data from the World Values Survey to analyze the transmis-
sion of autonomous behavior and run a sequential logit model. We use
the information on immigrants available from the wave covering the period
1994-1998 and investigate what influences individuals’ migration, location
and behavioral decisions. We allow immigrants coming from different coun-
tries to sort in more than fifty countries grouped as defined above and repeat
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the analysis to investigate what drives the location and behavioral decisions
of immigrants joining either an European region or a region in the United
States. The results of the empirical analysis indicate that culture is impor-
tant to explain immigrants’ decisions and in particular that immigrants’
autonomy is largely influenced by the average autonomy of the individuals
living in the host region or country; also, some categories of immigrants
may be better off in countries with better institutional environments.
Our work contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First,
while the analysis of the impact of culture on economic outcomes is widespread
at a macroeconomic level, the empirical research investigating the impact
of cultural beliefs on individual decision-making is still at its infancy and
largely unexplored. This paper represents one of the few attempts in this
direction. Second, following Marini (2016) we estimate a model of sequen-
tial decisions where individuals, after deciding whether to migrate, sort
themselves in a given destination region and, subsequently, make a behav-
ioral choice. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this
methodology is applied to explain cultural transmission of individual free-
dom in social interactions models. Third, our empirical results indicate
that individual beliefs are shaped by individuals’ expectation about col-
lective cultural beliefs. Our study analyzes the impact of average beliefs
and expectations rather than individual preferences. This implies that the
empirical model used in this paper falls in the category of observational
learning models (Manski, 2000). Therefore, our findings may provide im-
portant policy implications that call for further empirical investigations on
the relationship between cultural traits and economic outcomes. Fourth,
differently from the previous literature that examined vertical transmission
of collective beliefs across generations of immigrants (Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales, 2008), in this study we examine and compare also the horizontal
transmission of collective beliefs from the indigenous population to immi-
grants and compare whether there are differences in the integration dynam-
ics of immigrants either in countries characterized by different degrees of
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economic and/or political freedom or in the United States and Europe.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we motivate our work
and explain how it relates to the relevant literature. In Section 3 we in-
troduce the theoretical framework, describe the empirical methodology and
present the data used in the analysis. In Section 4 the results for the analysis
on political and economic freedom are presented, we carry out a sensitivity
analysis to assess the reliability of our findings and comment on the results
obtained. Section 5 presents the results for the sorting of immigrants in
either the United States or Europe. In Section 6 we discuss the results and
draw some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Our paper builds on three different strands of literature. The first con-
cerns with the relationship between culture and economic outcomes. The
second deals with the issue of the transmission of cultural traits amongst
immigrants. Finally, the third is related with social interactions models to
explain horizontal transmission of culture.
The last decade witnessed a growing interest on the role of culture on
economic outcomes (Ferna´ndez, 2011; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015). Culture is broadly defined as the set of preferences,
values, and beliefs that distinguish one social group from another (Hofstede,
1984). Ferna´ndez (2008) summarizes three different empirical approaches to
study the role of culture in economics. While the first adopts survey-based
indicators of beliefs and values, the second compares economic outcomes
of immigrants to natives in a host country. Finally, the third approach
uses historical case studies as natural experiments. In this paper we exploit
the large heterogeneity in values and beliefs across individuals provided by
the World Values Survey to examine whether a specific cultural trait is
transmitted from the indigenous population to immigrants. Therefore, our
analysis is based on both the first two approaches suggested by Ferna´ndez
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(2008).
The cultural trait we focus on in this study is the level of free choice and
control individuals feel to have over their lives. While this variable has been
already used in the literature to evaluate the effect of cultural values on eco-
nomic performance (Tabellini, 2010), in this paper we interpret its meaning
along the lines suggested by the freedom of choice literature (Bavetta and
Peragine, 2006; Bavetta and Navarra, 2012): Greater freedom of choice and
control over one’s life grants individuals with higher autonomy in decision
making. Individual autonomy and independence has been argued to be an
important determinant of self-realization, happiness, entrepreneurial atti-
tudes, innovation and risk taking, dynamism and, more generally, better
economic performances (Bentz and Frey, 2004; Phelps, 2013; Doepke and
Zilibotti, 2013; Bavetta, Maimone and Navarra, 2014).
Our work is also related to a strand of research that examines the issue of
how values and beliefs are transmitted and of how, if at all, are immigrants
integrated. A recent literature analyzing the relationship between individ-
ual identities and social contexts emphasized how networks and social ties
systematically affect individual behavior when persons make choices and
undertake actions that are economically relevant (Constant and Zimmer-
mann, 2008; Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Herding behavior, compliance
and homophily generally prevail against non-conformity in decision-making
(Akerlof, 1997). On the other hand, economic theories of cultural integra-
tion examine and compare marginal gains and costs of different integration
strategies. The main result of these studies indicate that the prevalence
of an oppositional culture in the minority group can be sustained only if
the group is sufficiently large, the economic cost of the resulting actions
sufficiently small and there is enough segmentation in role models (Lazear,
1999; Bisin et al., 2011).
Finally, the paper also refers to the social interaction literature. So-
cial interactions models can be considered observational learning models,
which allow individuals to change and update their beliefs according to their
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experience (Manski, 2000). Although the theoretical literature on social in-
teractions is quite large (see Manski, 1993, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001,
2006, 2007) the empirical literature is still developing. Indeed, following
the most recent advances of this literature (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2006;
Zanella, 2007; Blume et al., 2011) and the empirical application (Marini,
2016) we estimate a social interactions model that, after allowing individ-
uals to choose if they want to migrate or not, models both the sorting of
immigrants into regions and their decision about whether they feel to be
autonomous. The use of a sequential logit model allows us also to perform
a sensitivity analysis and to assess whether and the extent to which the
results are sensitive to changes in the assumptions on unobservables. Al-
though, given the cross-sectional structure of the analysis, this framework
does not allow us to fully uncover the reasons why individuals migrate, the
sensitivity analysis enables us to check if the results are sensitive to changes
in unobservables and to address the critiques raised by Cameron and Heck-
man (1998) when estimating discrete choice models that model individual
decisions in a single time framework. The main innovation with respect
to this literature is that to the best of our knowledge this is the first ap-
plication of a social interactions model that estimates the impact of social
interactions on the formation of individual freedom (i.e. autonomy freedom,
henceforth AF) by means of a sequential logit model. As explained in the
next section, this theoretical framework is crucial to overcome limits of the
social interactions models, namely the selection and the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993, 2000).
3 Framework and Data
3.1 Theoretical Framework
In the analysis we use a model of social interactions to investigate the
impact of culture on individual decisions of immigrants sorting in different
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countries/regions.
The theoretical framework of our study is developed by following the re-
cent literature on social interactions (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella,
2007; Blume et al., 2011). These studies and the related literature are par-
ticularly appealing because they create a link between theory and empirics
of social interactions, allowing the researcher to estimate a model where
both the sorting of individuals into groups (e.g. in our case the location
decision) and the behavioral decision (in this study the decision on whether
to be autonomous) are taken by an individual.
Let each individual be indexed by i = 1, ...., I. The analysis of social
interactions requires that each individual is also a member of one group
g = 1, ...., G. The membership of a group can be either imposed by con-
struction or chosen by the agent. In the first case, the model is a random
assignment model. In the second case, which is the reference framework for
our empirical analysis, the model is a neighborhood model in which agents
are not randomly assigned, but are assumed to choose the place they want
to live in. However, we can assume that the model is a global interactions
model since the destination regions are large enough that each agent can-
not be assumed to have social interactions with all the other agents of the
population living in the same region (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Finally,
assuming that an individual is choosing a place to live implies that the in-
dividual is moving; thus, in order to make this assumption hold we have to
distinguish between migrants and non-migrants first (first transition), then
we should allow migrants to take the location decision (second transition)
and finally their behavioral decision (third transition).
The choice of the group as geographical entity is justified by the fact
that cultural beliefs are social outcomes and they are more likely to differ
across regions rather than across groups defined according to a different
non-geographical criterion. Although better definitions of regions would be
available (e.g. NUTS classifications) we decided to use the variable defining
regions in the WVS (x048) in order to allow a higher level of variability of the
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regional cultural endowments. For some of the countries this classification
is identical to the NUTS definitions so we can assume that results would
not substantially change.
Individuals decide if they want to migrate or not according to the max-
imization of a payoff function; our empirical framework is based on Brock
and Durlauf (2006) and Zanella (2007), where each individual maximizes
her/his utility function:
Vi = f
(
kg, ρg, hiω, Jgmig, εig, εigω
)
(1)
where kg are benefits and ρg are costs of living in a given region; hiω repre-
sents the private deterministic utility of individuals in group g made up by a
series of characteristics proper of the individual, Xi, and a series of region-
specific characteristics, Yg; mig is the social utility or social interactions
term (i.e. individual expectations about the behavior of other individuals
in a region)1 and εigω, εig reflect the random private utility, which is in part
specific of the individual and in part specific of individuals living in a region.
Finally, Jg is the parameter that measures the strength of social interac-
tions. It has been shown by the previous literature (e.g. Brock and Durlauf,
2001, 2006; Zanella, 2007) that when complementarities are strong enough,
J , jointly with the roles played by both the private and the random utility,
determines the presence of multiple equilibria and the possible presence of
social traps due to resilience of low type outcomes (e.g. individuals conform
to low levels of either social or individual outcomes). Thus, the presence of
a sizeable J is a necessary condition for the existence of multiple equilibria.
In our model the individuals make three decisions: the first decision is
a choice between migrating (1) or not migrating (-1); the second decision is
a choice between migrating to a destination (1) or another (-1) conditional
on migrating and finally the third decision is about being autonomous (1)
1As it is commonly assumed by the social interactions literature, meig = mig, that
is, assuming self-consistency (i.e. rationality of individuals) implies that the subjective
expectations equal the objective probability. This assumption closes the model.
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Figure 1: Decision Tree
or not being autonomous (-1) conditional on living in the recently joined
destination. In each of these three choices the individual chooses 1 only if:
V (1)− V (−1) > 0 (2)
that indicates that the individual makes a choice only if the corresponding
payoff is higher than the payoff (s)he could get from making the alternative
choice.
3.2 The Empirical Model
Following a framework similar to the one adopted in Marini (2016) we use a
sequential logit model (Mare, 1980; Maddala, 1983; Buis, 2011) to estimate
the decision process described in Figure 1, where individuals undertake
three sequential decisions: the migration decision, the location decision and
the behavioral decision. Several reasons support our choice of considering
the behavioral choice as the outcome of a sequential decision process. First,
it is more realistic to think that individuals who migrate to a new environ-
ment make a behavioral choice only after they have sorted themselves into
destination regions. This allows them to observe the collective behavior of
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individuals living in such regions and form realistic expectations accord-
ingly. Second, the use of a sequential logit model allows the researcher to
overcome the standard problems characterizing social interaction models:
The reflection and the self-selection problems (Manski, 1993, 2000). Indeed,
the estimation of a social interactions model by means of a linear-in-mean
model may generate identification problems due to the co-movements of
contextual effects (Yg) together with the expectations on average beliefs
(mig). This makes impossible to disentangle their separate effect on indi-
vidual beliefs. The use of nonlinear estimators solves the reflection problem
and allows model identification (Brock and Durlauf, 2007; Blume et al.,
2011). The sequential structure of the model helps us to deal with the
self-selection problem.
The econometric model can be formalized as follows. We assume that
individuals decide whether to migrate m (y, n), where y and n mean they
choose to either migrate or not to migrate, respectively. If they decide
to migrate they have to select a destination group/region g (0, 1). More
specifically, we allow immigrants to sort in countries/regions that are, al-
ternatively: a) either politically free or not politically free; b) either eco-
nomically free or not economically free; c) either in the United States or
in Europe. Therefore, 1 indicates alternatively economies that are either
politically free or economically free or in Europe, and 0 indicates economies
that are alternatively either not politically free or not economically free or
in the United States. Once they have chosen where to migrate, they de-
cide how to behave ω (Lω, Hω), where Lω indicates that individuals choose
not to be autonomous and Hω indicates that individuals choose to be au-
tonomous.2 For the sake of simplicity, we refer to those individual who
2The behavioral choice may be considered as an actual decision and behavior resulting
from the belief of the individual about his/her own autonomy. Also, since immigrants
have been interviewed while they were already in the host country, and given that we
evaluate the behavioral decision across groups of countries that are similar in terms of
economic and/or political institutions, we assume the absence of discrepancies in in-
terpretation of the question. For this reason, we do not consider necessary the use of
vignettes (e.g. King and Wand, 2007) to compare survey answers. Any further hetero-
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make the H behavioral choice as H-type individuals and those who make
L behavioral choice as L-type individuals; the same can be said for the lo-
cation decisions between economicallyfree countries and countries that are
not economically/politically free.
Thus, we can formalize the three decisions as follows. First of all an
individual faces a migration decision:
Pim = p1 = Pr (im = 1|x, u) = Λ(β01 + β11age+ β21age2 + β31eduL+
+ β41eduH + β61female+ β71married+ β81child+ β91ft+ β101pt+
+ β111Self − empl + β141u) (3)
where m indicates the migration decision, Pim the probability of migrating.
If the individual decides to migrate, (s)he has to choose the region (s)he
wants to move to: therefore, (s)he faces the location decision where g (0, 1)
on the basis of the chosen destination,
Pig|m=1 = p2 = Pr (ig = 1|x, u, im = 1) = Λ(β02 + β12age+ β22age2+
+ β32eduL+ β42eduH + β52eduavg + β62female+ β72married+
+ β82child+ β92ft+ β102pt+ β112Self − empl + β122difftrust+
β132afavg + β142u) (4)
where Pig|m=1 = p2 is the probability for the immigrant to sort herself/himself
in region 1.
Finally, once the individual reaches the destination, (s)he has to under-
geneity is accounted for by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
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take the behavioral decision as follows:
Piω|m=1,g=0 = p3 = Pr (iω = 1|x, u, im = 1, ig = 0) = Λ(β03 + β13age+
+ β23age2 + β33eduL+ β43eduH + β53eduavg + β63female+
+ β73married+ β83child+ β93ft+ β103pt+ β113Self − empl+
+ β123difftrust+ β133afavg + β143u) (5)
Piω|m=1,g=1 = p4 = Pr (iω = 1|x, u, im = 1, ig = 1) = Λ(β04 + β14age+
+ β24age2 + β34eduL+ β44eduH + β54eduavg + β64female+
+ β74married+ β84child+ β94ft+ β104pt+ β114Self − empl+
+ β124difftrust+ β134afavg + β144u) (6)
where Piω|m=1,g=0 = p3 is the probability of being an H-type immigrant who
decides to move to region 2, and Piω|m=1,g=1 = p4 is the probability of being
an H-type immigrant who chooses to move to region 1. Finally, ω indicates
the binary behavioral choice.
The sequential choices in our empirical model are explained by the fol-
lowing socio-demographic independent variables: age and age2 capture each
individual’s age and its square value, respectively. While eduL and eduH
measure the individual’s education level, eduavg is the average level of edu-
cation existing in the destination region. Female indicates if the individual
is a female, married and single indicate his/her marital status and child
if he/she has children. The individual’s employment status is captured by
the variables ft, pt and self-empl if the individual is either a full-time, or
a part-time worker or self-employed, respectively. The difference between
the average level of trust in the destination region and that in the region
where the individual comes from is difftrust. The social interactions term
(i.e., mig in Eq. (1)) is afavg. It represents our variable of interest because
it captures the influence of collective beliefs on individual choices over the
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three-stages of the decision process. Finally, β0j (j = 1 to 4) is the constant
term for each of the four decisions and β14ju (j = 1 to 4) is the error term
for equation j.
Before proceeding with the empirical estimation it is important to dwell
upon the importance of the coefficients of the unobservables. According to
the related literature, unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased results,
even though the unobserved variables are not confounding variables (e.g.
Cameron and Heckman, 1998). Indeed, the presence of unobservables may
give rise to two distinct phenomena, both arising from the necessity to
model a stylized discrete model: the averaging mechanism and the selection
mechanism.
Any logit or discrete choice model consists of a simplification of the re-
ality since all the variables that might have an influence on the modeled
decisions cannot be included. This may have consequences that should be
properly addressed. Specifically, in a sequential logit model the averag-
ing mechanism refers to the fact that when we estimate the probability of
passing a transition in presence of unobserved heterogeneity we are esti-
mating the probability of passing a transition averaged over the excluded
variable, which for sake of simplicity can be thought as a weighted average
of all the unobserved variables. Said it differently, estimating a model that
does not control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity implies that
we are modeling the average probability of passing a transition, while ac-
counting for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity allows to model the
original probability that an individual passes the transitions (Buis, 2011).
Hence, estimating a model without modeling the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity is problematic because in a non-linear model the impact of
the regressors on the averaged probability differs from their impact on the
probability (Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Allison, 1999).
The selection mechanism, instead, refers to the possibility that a variable
that does not affect the first transition will become a confounding variable
from the second transition onward due to the self-selection process (Mare,
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1980; Cameron and Heckman, 1998). In the context of our empirical model,
for instance, we may think at preferences for redistribution: while they do
not necessarily affect the migration decision, they may play a significant
role in the location decision as well as in the behavioral decision.
Thus, following Marini (2016) we assume that unobserved heterogeneity
is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation (σ) equal to 1
and we allow it to be correlated with the variable of interest (afavg) to con-
trol for the possible presence of endogeneity (Train, 2003; Buis, 2011). We
can conceive this variable as a weighted sum of all the weighted variables ex-
cluded from the model that could eventually be correlated with our variable
of interest. This assumption also justifies the distributional assumption.
Furthermore, since this variable is a weighted sum of all other variables,
it includes variables that could possibly be both positively and negatively
correlated with our variable of interest. This makes the assumption of a
positive but not very high correlation (ρ = 0.25) reasonable. However, we
provide robustness checks to verify whether the results are invariant to the
change of these assumptions.
We estimate the model by using the Stata seqlogit command (Buis,
2011), which estimates the sequential logit by maximum likelihood and the
scenarios by means of simulated maximum likelihood. Indeed, as specified
by the literature (Buis, 2011; Cameron and Heckman, 1998), assuming the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity that follows a normal distribution
and that could be correlated with the regressors included in the analysis
does not allow to get a closed form solution for the integrals computing the
probability of passing a transition. This can be overcome by using simulated
maximum likelihood that uses numerical approximation to compute the
probability of passing a transition and the average of all the probabilities
(Train, 2003).
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3.3 The Data
The data used in the analysis are collected from both survey data and eco-
nomic data sets and they are both individual-specific and location-specific.
Most of the data are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS hereafter)
for all the samples. All these variables are defined in Table A that can be
found in the Appendix. Although the WVS data contains more rounds,
only one of these waves could be used for the analysis because the question
on immigrants is asked only in one wave (1994-1998).3 This reduces the
sample size and limits the analysis. We are aware that more complete data
sets are available for the analysis of migration decision, but unfortunately
the WVS is the reference data set for the question on autonomy so we could
only use this survey.
For the dependent variable, AF, we use a question taken from the WVS
and largely used by the literature on cultural economics (e.g. Tabellini,
2010). The question used is the following: “Some people feel they have
completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel
that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use
a ten point scale in which 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you have over the ways
your life turns out”. We derive an indicator taking value 1 if the individual
chooses a point greater than 5 and 0 otherwise, as already done in the
previous literature (e.g. Marini, 2013).
To build the variable on difference in trust we used answers to the WVS
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”; using this question
we constructed an indicator taking value 1 if individuals answer that “most
people can be trusted” and value 0 otherwise and computed regional aver-
3Another wave contains such information, but for a few countries. Thus, in order to
avoid problems of time inconsistency and the presence of multiple observations for a same
country across waves only the wave with the most complete information (1994-1998) is
kept for the analysis.
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ages. We also computed regional averages for the variable indicating the
area of origin of immigrants, representing the average level of trust of indi-
viduals living in each specific area. The question asks : “Are you born in
this country? Birth country” and the answer can be yes, indicating that the
individual is not an emigrant or it indicates the area of origin, which could
be Latin America, USA/Canada, Asia, Europe, Africa, Other or Oceania.
Although this is not the real value of the average level of trust in a specific
region of origin, we assume that the average level of immigrants from that
region is representative of the region itself. Thus, after computing the differ-
ence between these two levels of trust, we have higher values for the regions
where the average level of trust is higher than the region of provenience of
the immigrant.
The variables for demographics are also taken from the WVS data set
and are listed in the Appendix. We build the values for the social inter-
actions term as averages over the regions considered. For the law of large
numbers we can assume that this average does not differ from the average
computed on all the individuals in the region but the respondent.
Finally, we use the indicators of overall freedom available from the Her-
itage Foundation and the definition of politically free country available from
the Freedom House. We classify a country as economically free if the av-
erage overall economic freedom enjoyed by the country is higher than the
total average overall freedom over the time span considered (1994-1998).
We define a country as politically free if it is classified as overall fully po-
litically free over the time framework considered in our study. We reckon
that this may be endogenously determined, but it is exogenous at the time
of individual decisions.
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4 Economic and Political Freedom: Empiri-
cal Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the averages of individual (autonomy freedom) cultural cap-
ital endowments for the countries of the sample (columns (1) and (6)), as
well as averages of collective (trust) cultural capital (columns (2) and (7)),
whether the country is economically free (columns (3) and (8)) or politi-
cally free (columns (4) and (9)). As it is possible to notice, countries that
are economically free are generally also categorized as politically free, with
a few exceptions. The Table indicates that countries that are economi-
cally (politically) free have overall higher levels of both trust and autonomy
than countries that are not economically (politically) free and the Wilcoxon
Mann-Withney test indicates that they statistically differ across the two
samples. Furthermore, the Kruskal-Wallis tests show that the means of
the countries in the samples (35 for economic freedom and 36 for political
freedom) are jointly statistically different.
Although these averages should be taken as indicative and no causality
can be inferred, they clearly support the previous literature (e.g. Tabellini,
2008a; Marini, 2013) that points out the presence of a positive correlation
between institutional quality and cultural endowments. Yet, as it has been
already stressed along the paper, since these two cultural traits are sup-
posed to be facilitators to economic outcomes (e.g. economic growth and
individual efficiency and productivity, see for instance Tabellini, 2010), the
economic consequences due to conformism of individuals to different cul-
tural endowments may, in the long term, generate multiple equilibria, social
traps and diverging economic paths across countries and regions.
These results are not surprising and confirm what we expected. How-
ever, they are particularly interesting for our analysis because they play a
crucial role in the regression results. Indeed, regional trust is used to com-
19
T
ab
le
1:
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e
an
d
In
d
iv
id
u
al
C
u
lt
u
ra
l
C
ap
it
al
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
ve
ra
ge
L
ev
el
s
of
C
u
lt
u
re
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
F
T
ru
st
E
co
n
om
ic
F
re
ed
om
P
ol
it
ic
al
F
re
ed
om
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
F
T
ru
st
E
co
n
om
ic
F
re
ed
om
P
ol
it
ic
al
F
re
ed
om
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
T
u
rk
ey
0.
36
63
0.
05
50
N
F
S
p
ai
n
0.
62
66
0.
29
73
N
N
B
el
ar
u
s
0.
39
60
0.
24
07
N
N
S
ou
th
A
fr
ic
a
0.
64
48
0.
15
85
Y
Y
U
k
ra
in
e
0.
41
63
0.
30
97
N
N
S
lo
va
k
ia
0.
66
45
0.
27
04
N
Y
R
u
ss
ia
0.
43
37
0.
23
94
N
N
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c
0.
67
66
0.
28
52
Y
Y
A
rm
en
ia
0.
47
29
0.
24
68
N
N
U
ru
gu
ay
0.
70
09
0.
21
64
Y
Y
M
ol
d
ov
a
0.
50
21
0.
22
21
N
N
S
lo
ve
n
ia
0.
70
54
0.
15
54
N
Y
G
eo
rg
ia
0.
59
10
0.
18
71
N
N
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
0.
72
50
0.
17
57
Y
Y
M
ac
ed
on
ia
0.
60
44
0.
08
21
n
a
N
G
er
m
an
y
0.
74
22
0.
33
29
Y
Y
C
ro
at
ia
0.
67
35
0.
52
32
N
N
C
h
il
e
0.
77
59
0.
21
39
Y
Y
C
h
in
a
0.
70
25
0.
24
07
N
N
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
0.
79
33
0.
36
96
Y
Y
N
ig
er
ia
0.
74
01
0.
17
29
N
N
N
or
w
ay
0.
80
14
0.
65
30
Y
Y
D
om
in
ic
an
R
ep
u
b
li
c
0.
79
26
0.
26
45
N
N
U
n
it
ed
S
ta
te
s
0.
82
72
0.
35
94
Y
Y
M
ex
ic
o
0.
80
46
0.
31
15
N
N
T
ai
w
an
0.
82
84
0.
38
20
Y
Y
V
en
ez
u
el
a
0.
82
49
0.
13
75
N
N
S
w
ed
en
0.
83
08
0.
59
67
Y
Y
B
u
lg
ar
ia
0.
43
95
0.
28
60
N
Y
A
u
st
ra
li
a
0.
84
30
0.
40
05
Y
Y
L
at
v
ia
0.
50
43
0.
24
74
Y
Y
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
0.
86
98
0.
49
05
Y
Y
E
st
on
ia
0.
56
19
0.
21
52
Y
Y
F
in
la
n
d
0.
89
62
0.
48
81
Y
Y
L
it
h
u
an
ia
0.
56
92
0.
21
92
N
Y
J
ap
an
0.
55
31
Y
Y
R
om
an
ia
0.
60
32
0.
18
70
N
Y
H
u
n
ga
ry
0.
60
82
0.
22
74
N
Y
N
ot
E
co
n
om
ic
al
ly
F
re
e
0.
57
61
**
*
0.
23
90
**
*
N
ot
P
ol
it
ic
al
ly
F
re
e
0.
57
12
**
*
0.
23
69
**
*
E
co
n
om
ic
al
ly
F
re
e
0.
73
96
**
*
0.
33
28
**
*
P
ol
it
ic
al
ly
F
re
e
0.
71
02
**
*
0.
30
98
**
*
[-
37
.9
09
]
[-
22
.9
70
]
[-
32
.5
00
]
[-
18
.0
94
]
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
K
ru
sk
al
-W
al
li
s
te
st
χ
2
+
3
5
a
f
=
[3
56
9.
77
]∗
∗∗
χ
2
+
3
6
a
f
=
[3
57
5.
09
]∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
χ
2 3
5
tr
u
s
t
=
[2
29
3.
67
9]
∗∗
∗
χ
2
+
3
6
tr
u
s
t
=
[2
39
9.
99
]∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
N
ot
es
:
C
ou
n
tr
y
cu
lt
u
ra
l
av
er
ag
es
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
.
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s
ar
e
d
efi
n
ed
as
ec
on
om
ic
al
ly
fr
ee
if
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
ec
on
om
ic
fr
ee
d
om
ov
er
th
e
p
er
io
d
co
n
si
d
er
ed
is
h
ig
h
er
th
an
th
e
ov
er
al
l
ec
on
om
ic
fr
ee
d
om
;
th
ey
ar
e
d
efi
n
ed
as
p
ol
it
ic
al
ly
fr
ee
if
th
ey
ar
e
ov
er
al
l
fu
ll
y
p
ol
it
ic
al
ly
fr
ee
ov
er
th
e
p
er
io
d
co
n
si
d
er
ed
.
[]
re
p
or
t
th
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
W
il
co
x
on
M
an
n
W
h
it
n
ey
tw
o-
sa
m
p
le
te
st
to
te
st
cu
lt
u
ra
l
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
d
iff
er
en
ce
ac
ro
ss
ec
on
om
ic
al
ly
(p
ol
it
ic
al
ly
)
fr
ee
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
ve
rs
u
s
n
ot
ec
on
om
ic
al
ly
(n
ot
p
ol
it
ic
al
ly
)
fr
ee
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
an
d
fo
r
th
e
K
ru
sk
al
-
W
al
li
s
(K
W
)
te
st
to
te
st
fo
r
jo
in
t
cu
lt
u
ra
l
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
d
iff
er
en
ce
am
on
g
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
b
el
on
gi
n
g
to
th
e
tw
o
sa
m
p
le
s.
p
-v
al
u
es
ar
e
in
()
.
**
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l,
**
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l,
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
W
or
ld
V
a
lu
es
S
u
rv
ey
,
y
ea
rs
19
94
-1
99
8.
20
pute differences in trustworthiness between host region and home area of
origin. Regional autonomy is instead the social interactions term observed
by the immigrants and used to take their behavioral decision. Thus, if im-
migrants join a region where individual autonomy is on average low, and,
if they decide to conform to what they think is the level of such average
and if the impact of such expectation is positive and strong enough, this
may generate multiple equilibria and segregation, leading societies with low
average autonomy being socially trapped. Indeed, if individuals keep think-
ing that on average other individuals in a society feel not to have enough
control on their own lives, and they conform to such low autonomy, unless
a positive shock (capable to make their expectations change and be higher)
occur they will keep conforming to such low average behavior (Lω). This
motivates the econometric analysis carried out in the next sections.
4.2 Economic Freedom
4.2.1 Empirical Results
Table 2 (Panel A) shows the results obtained when individuals should decide
between migrating to a country defined as economically free or a country
that is not economically free as defined in the data section.
In Table 2 and in subsequent table presenting sequential logit estima-
tions, columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) report the marginal effects computed at
the mean, while columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the respective standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and computed using the delta method.
The baseline scenarios for the regressions presented are estimated using a
value for the correlation of the unobserved variable of 0.25 (ρ = 0.25) and
a standard deviation of 1 (σ = 1).
The results in Table 2 indicate that the decision to migrate slightly
increases with age. In addition, individuals with at most compulsory edu-
cation are less likely to migrate than individuals with intermediate levels of
education, while individuals with at least tertiary education are more likely
21
to migrate than individuals with intermediate levels of education. Both
married and singles are less likely to migrate than the reference group (i.e.
widowed or divorced). Having children reduces the probability to migrate.
Individuals who are either working full-time or self-employed are less likely
to migrate than individuals with another working status.
Regarding the location decision, older immigrants are more likely to join
an economically free region; furthermore, immigrants with at least tertiary
education are less likely to sort themselves in an economically free region
than immigrants with either low or intermediate levels of education. Singles
are less likely to join an economically free region than immigrants with an-
other marital status and immigrants with children are less likely to join an
economically free country than immigrants without children. Immigrants
that work full-time are more likely to join economically free economies than
immigrants working part-time, self-employed or in the reference group (i.e.
students, housekeepers, retired, unemployed). Finally, both the difference
in trustworthiness and the social interactions term have a significant and
sizeable impact on the location decision, indicating that both the difference
in trustworthiness between host region and area of origin and average au-
tonomy are higher in places that are economically free than in places that
are not economically free.
Immigrants are more likely to be autonomous in a place that is not
economically free (columns (5) and (6)) if they have university or higher
education and they experience higher autonomy in places where average ed-
ucation is lower. In places that are not economically free female immigrants
are less likely to be autonomous than males and immigrants with children
are less likely to be autonomous than immigrants with no children. Also,
immigrants who work full-time or are self-employed are more likely to be au-
tonomous than immigrants in the reference category (i.e. retired, students,
housekeepers or unemployed) or working part-time. Finally, while the dif-
ference in trustworthiness levels does not significantly affect the behavioral
decision, the social interactions term plays a significant and positive role:
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Table 2: Immigrants and Social Interactions: Economic Freedom
Panel A: Regression Results
Dependent Variable Migration Decision Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age 0.00*** (0.000) 0.03*** (0.006) 0.00 (0.007) 0.00 (0.000)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000)
eduL -0.03*** (0.002) -0.00 (0.043) -0.09 (0.061) -0.11*** (0.043)
eduH 0.02*** (0.002) -0.10*** (0.033) 0.07* (0.040) 0.11*** (0.040)
educavg 0.09 (0.088) -0.32*** (0.102) -0.20* (0.103)
female -0.00 (0.002) -0.02 (0.029) -0.13*** (0.036) 0.00 (0.032)
married -0.01*** (0.002) -0.03 (0.024) -0.02 (0.047) 0.04 (0.039)
single -0.03*** (0.004) -0.23*** (0.068) 0.04 (0.093) 0.01 (0.070)
child -0.01*** (0.002) -0.26*** (0.047) -0.17** (0.070) -0.05 (0.043)
ft -0.00** (0.002) 0.06* (0.034) 0.14*** (0.042) 0.16*** (0.038)
pt -0.00 (0.003) 0.04 (0.055) 0.08 (0.075) 0.12** (0.059)
Self-empl -0.02*** (0.004) -0.03 (0.072) 0.19** (0.089) 0.18** (0.078)
dtr 0.65*** (0.137) -0.10 (0.176) -0.26* (0.149)
afavg 2.14*** (0.090) 0.74*** (0.115) 1.49*** (0.107)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 42,682
log-pseudol -13,758.00
Panel B: Sensitivity Analysis
σud = 1; ρ = 0.3 dtr 0.65*** (0.137) -0.10 (0.175) -0.26 (0.150)
afavg 2.07*** (0.089) 0.67*** (0.115) 1.43*** (0.109)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.2 dtr 0.65*** (0.138) -0.10 (0.176) -0.26 (0.149)
afavg 2.21*** (0.090) 0.82*** (0.115) 1.54*** (0.107)
σud = 0.5; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.56*** (0.121) -0.13 (0.153) -0.28* (0.148)
afavg 1.98*** (0.079) 0.58*** (0.097) 1.41*** (0.124)
σud = 0; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.51*** (0.110) -0.15 (0.144) -0.26* (0.136)
afavg 1.95*** (0.075) 0.62*** (0.090) 1.37*** (0.122)
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) report the marginal effects at
the mean for respectively migration decision, immigrants’ location decision, their behavioral decision in L-type
economies and their behavioral decision in H-type economies; columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the standard
errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are
robust to heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
Source: World Values Survey, years 1994-1998.
immigrants’ decision to be autonomous is significantly and positively influ-
enced by their expectations about the average level of individual freedom
in a region.
Immigrants in an economically free region (columns (7) and (8)) with
at most compulsory education are less likely to be autonomous than im-
migrants with intermediate levels of education, while immigrants with at
least tertiary education are more likely to enjoy higher levels of individ-
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ual freedom. They are also more likely to be autonomous in regions with
lower average levels of education. Furthermore, immigrants working full-
time, part-time or self-employed are more likely to be autonomous than
immigrants in the reference group. Finally, while the difference in trust-
worthiness between host region and area of origin is negative and significant
at the 10 percent for the behavioral decision, the social interactions term
has a positive, significant and large impact on the behavioral decision. This
implies that immigrants, when deciding whether they feel to be autonomous
or not, are largely influenced by their expectations about the average level
of individual freedom of other individuals living in the region they join.
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 2 (Panel B) reports the results for the sensitivity analysis on the re-
gression results presented in Panel A. As it is possible to notice, the results
are qualitatively invariant disregarding the type of assumption changed (i.e.
whether distributional assumptions or correlation assumption of the unob-
servables are changed).4 Finally, although the estimated effects may slightly
differ in size, this is justified by the fact that changing either correlation of
the unobservables with the variable of interest or its distributional assump-
tions may vary the impact that both the difference in trustworthiness and
the social interactions term may have on the behavioral decision: different
degrees of correlation between characteristics proper of the economy or of
the individual not included among the regressors and the variable of interest
may lead to slightly different effects of both the social interactions terms
and the difference in trustworthiness on the decision of immigrants to be au-
4The only exception is the parameter estimated for the difference in trustworthiness
between host country and the area of origin, which looses its significance when we vary
the correlation assumption. Although the results are similar (in the baseline scenario
it was significant only at a 10 percent level and this significance is maintained when
varying scenarios for the distributional assumption) we may think that such lost signifi-
cance may be due to the presence of other features such as nonlinear effectsbetween the
unobservables correlated with the social interactions term and the term itself.
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tonomous or not. However, these effects do not significantly differ in terms
of quality, significance and direction of causality, so we may conclude that
the results are robust to changes in both distributional assumptions of un-
observables and changes in correlation assumptions between unobservables
and the variable of interest.
4.3 Political Freedom
4.3.1 Empirical Results
Table 3 (Panel A) shows the results obtained when individuals should decide
between migrating to a country defined as politically free or to a country
that is not fully politically free as defined in the data section.
Columns (1) and (2), reporting the individuals’ migration decision, show
that migration slightly increases with age at a constant rate; also, individ-
uals with at most a compulsory education level are less likely to migrate
than individuals with intermediate levels of education, while individuals
with tertiary education or higher are more likely to migrate than individ-
uals with intermediate education level. Both married and singles are less
likely to migrate than individuals belonging to the reference group (i.e. di-
vorced, widowed, retired and housekeepers). Furthermore, individuals with
children are less likely to migrate than individuals without children. Indi-
viduals who either are self-employed or have a full-time job are less likely
to migrate than individuals with another working status.
Regarding the location decision (columns (3) and (4)), representing the
probability for a person that decides to migrate to join a region in a fully
politically free country, older immigrants are more likely to sort themselves
in a politically free country than younger immigrants. Immigrants with
tertiary education are less likely to join a politically free country than im-
migrants with at most either intermediate or compulsory education. Singles
are less likely than married or immigrants with another marital status to
sort in a fully politically free country; immigrants with children are less
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Table 3: Immigrants and Social Interactions: Political Freedom
Panel A: Regression Results
Dependent Variable Migration Decision Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age 0.00*** (0.000) 0.03*** (0.006) 0.01 (0.007) -0.00 (0.006)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000)
eduL -0.03*** (0.002) 0.01 (0.043) -0.07 (0.064) -0.11*** (0.044)
eduH 0.02*** (0.002) -0.09*** (0.032) 0.10** (0.042) 0.08** (0.038)
educavg -0.01 (0.091) -0.03 (0.092) -0.32** (0.105)
female -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.029) -0.13*** (0.038) -0.00 (0.032)
married -0.01*** (0.002) -0.02 (0.037) -0.00 (0.049) 0.04 (0.039)
single -0.03*** (0.004) -0.15** (0.068) 0.09 (0.097) 0.02 (0.069)
child -0.01*** (0.003) -0.24*** (0.046) -0.19*** (0.072) -0.04 (0.043)
ft -0.00** (0.002) 0.07** (0.034) 0.11** (0.044) 0.19*** (0.038)
pt -0.00 (0.003) 0.04 (0.056) 0.09 (0.079) 0.11* (0.058)
Self-empl -0.02*** (0.004) -0.04 (0.075) 0.16* (0.093) 0.20*** (0.078)
dtr 0.29** (0.140) -0.30 (0.184) -0.15 (0.146)
afavg 2.12*** (0.092) 0.73*** (0.118) 1.39*** (0.108)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 43,654
log-pseudol -13,915.02
Panel B: Sensitivity Analysis
σud = 1; ρ = 0.3 dtr 0.28** (0.139) -0.30 (0.183) -0.15 (0.147)
afavg 2.05*** (0.092) 0.66*** (0.118) 1.32*** (0.109)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.2 dtr 0.29** (0.140) -0.30 (0.184) -0.15 (0.146)
afavg 2.20*** (0.093) 0.80*** (0.118) 1.45*** (0.107)
σud = 0.5; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.22* (0.115) -0.29 (0.162) -0.14 (0.140)
afavg 1.83*** (0.078) 0.57*** (0.101) 1.27*** (0.118)
σud = 0; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.19** (0.103) -0.28* (0.153) -0.13 (0.127)
afavg 1.77*** (0.073) 0.61*** (0.094) 1.23*** (0.115)
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) report the marginal effects at
the mean for respectively migration decision, immigrants’ location decision, their behavioral decision in L-type
economies and their behavioral decision in H-type economies; columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the standard
errors (in parenthesis) for the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are
robust to heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
Source: World Values Survey, years 1994-1998.
likely to join a fully politically free country than immigrants with no chil-
dren: these last results indicate probably that singles are more willing to
join critical regions than e.g. married and that some immigrants with chil-
dren are probably those who migrate for their situation (e.g. refugees) who
have as priority leaving their country disregarding whether the final desti-
nation region is a country enjoying full political freedom or not. Full-time
workers are more likely than other types of workers to migrate to fully po-
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litically free regions. Finally, both difference in trustworthiness between
host region and area of origin and average levels of individual freedom are
higher in economies that have full political freedom.
Immigrants that live in a place that is not fully politically free (columns
(5) and (6)) are more autonomous if they have tertiary or higher educa-
tion. Females are less likely to be autonomous than males, immigrants
with children are less autonomous than immigrants who have no children.
Besides, full-time workers are more likely to be autonomous than workers
working part-time or workers in the reference group (i.e. retired, students,
housekeepers), the same can be said for self-employed, although this effect
is significant only at the 10 percent level. Finally, while the difference in
trustworthiness between host region and area of origin does not significantly
impact autonomy of immigrants, the social interactions term (i.e. the per-
ceived average level of individual freedom in a region) has a significant,
positive and large impact on it.
Immigrants who join a politically free region (columns (7) and (8)) with
only compulsory education are less likely to be autonomous than immi-
grants with intermediate levels of education, while immigrants with tertiary
or higher education are more likely to be autonomous than immigrants
with intermediate levels of education. Immigrants are significantly more
likely to be autonomous if they live in regions with lower levels of educa-
tion. Immigrants with a job (disregarding whether full-time, part-time or
self-employed) are more likely to be autonomous than individuals in the
reference category and the effect is strongly significant for both full-time
workers and self-employed, while working part-time is significant only at
a 10 percent level. The difference in trustworthiness between host region
and area of origin is not significant, indicating that this variable is not a
determinant of individual autonomy in countries that are politically free
(or also the possible presence of nonlinear effects e.g. between immigrants
coming from different areas of the world); instead, the social interactions
term is strongly significant and very sizeable, indicating that the higher the
27
average level of individual freedom in a region, the more likely immigrants
are to perceive they are autonomous.
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 (Panel B) reports the results for the sensitivity analysis. Although
the estimated marginal effects slightly vary in term of size (probably due
to the fact that both the difference in trustworthiness and the average level
of autonomy are strictly associated to factors such as e.g. the average level
of trustworthiness in a region, the individual willingness to pay for pub-
lic goods and other individual characteristics, that are likely to be part of
the unobservables), their impact do not vary in terms of significance5 and
direction of causality so we may say that the results are not significantly dif-
ferent from the baseline results and this is true for each simulated scenario,
disregarding the type of simulation (i.e. whether we change distributional
assumptions or correlation assumptions). Thus, we may conclude that the
results are not sensitive to changing assumptions on unobservables.
5 Beliefs in a Just World: Explaining Au-
tonomy in the United States and Europe
Table 4 contains the countries and regional averages for the two cultural
endowments of interest in the analysis, that is, trust and individual freedom
in Europe (Panel A) and the United States (Panel B). Since, as we have
mentioned before, these two variables can be considered as measures for,
respectively, collective and individual cultural capital, we can think of them
being representative of the cultural endowment of an economy.
As it is possible to notice in Table 4.A, Finland and Germany, countries
5The only term that is significantly different is the difference in trustworthiness for
the location decision that, when assuming zero variance for the unobservables, becomes
significant at the 10 percent level.
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generally endowed with higher trustworthiness, show indeed higher levels of
trust. Instead, Spain has lower overall values for both trust and autonomy.
This evidence suggests that countries with better economic performance
are also those with higher cultural endowment, supporting the theory and
findings of the cultural economics literature (e.g. Tabellini, 2010). When we
look at the within-country cultural differences, we can notice that, overall,
the results are in line with the cross-country findings: The higher the stage
of development of a region, the higher is its cultural endowment. A similar
result is obtained when looking at regional differences across the United
States (Panel B).
Comparing the results in Panel A and B of Table 4 we can notice that
overall the average autonomy of individuals is higher in countries with bet-
ter economic performance (i.e. Finland, Germany and the United States)
and much lower in Spain. The same can be said about trust. In order
to formally test such differences we report a two-sample Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test for both autonomy and trust, which suggest that, overall,
the two averages for autonomy are statistically significantly different across
Europe and the United States. This is not the case for the two averages
on trust. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test is in favor of joint statistical
significant differences across all the averages of the sample for both types of
cultural capital. These results can be interpreted as the findings in Table
1, so once again we notice that cultural endowments and economic develop-
ment are positively correlated. Thus, to investigate this further we estimate
a sequential logit model. Unfortunately, lack of variability in the data does
not allow estimating the specification of the model that contains a dummy
for self-employed using actual data; thus, we simulate a data set with the
same individual and regional characteristics of the actual data but with
an enlarged number of observations. The estimation results are presented
in Table 5 (Panel A). The methodology used in Table 5 is very similar to
the ones used in previous regressions; however, the behavioral decision for
immigrants in the United States may be subject to identification problems
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Table 5: Immigrants and Social Interactions: Europe and the United States
Panel A: Regression Results
Dependent Variable Migration Decision Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(US regions) (EU regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age -0.00 (0.000) -0.02 (0.000) 0.02** (0.008) -0.04*** (0.008)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000)
eduL -0.01*** (0.002) -0.00 (0.000) -0.12** (0.059) -0.35*** (0.058)
eduH 0.05*** (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.51*** (0.145) -0.12*** (0.045)
educavg -0.09* (0.058) -0.81*** (0.225) -1.06*** (0.145)
female -0.00 (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.14*** (0.050) 0.21*** (0.038)
married 0.00** (0.001) -0.00 (0.002) 0.03 (0.055) -0.06 (0.055)
single 0.00** (0.002) -0.00 (0.003) -0.14* (0.076) -0.13 (0.067)
child 0.00 (0.001) -0.00 (0.000) 0.01 (0.040) -0.02 (0.046)
ft 0.00** (0.001) 0.00* (0.001) 0.16*** (0.051) -0.00 (0.044)
pt 0.00 (0.002) 0.01 (0.005) -0.01 (0.068) 0.04 (0.054)
Self-empl 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.002) 0.36*** (0.140) -0.07 (0.087)
dtr 0.08 (0.051) 0.67* (0.383) 0.73*** (0.211)
afavg -0.11 (0.068) 0.83***(ξ) (0.288) 0.73***(ξ) (0.181)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 48,027
log-pseudol -8,715.71
Panel B: Sensitivity Analysis - Europe and the United States
σud = 1; ρ = 0.2 dtr 0.08 (0.052) 0.67* (0.385) 0.74*** (0.213)
afavg -0.11 (0.068) 0.92***(ξ) (0.302) 0.80***(ξ) (0.184)
σud = 1; ρ = 0.3 dtr 0.08 (0.051) 0.66* (0.381) 0.72*** (0.208)
afavg -0.11 (0.068) 0.75***(ξ) (0.274) 0.65***(ξ) (0.178)
σud = 0.5; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.06* (0.038) 0.45 (0.302) 0.47*** (0.143)
afavg -0.09* (0.050) 0.77***(ξ) (0.264) 0.59***(ξ) (0.126)
σud = 0; ρ = 0.25 dtr 0.06* (0.035) 0.39 (0.271) 0.39*** (0.123)
afavg -0.8* (0.045) 0.84***(ξ) (0.275) 0.62***(ξ) (0.111)
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) report the marginal effects at the
mean for respectively immigrants’ location decision, their behavioral decision in US regions and their behav-
ioral decision in European regions; columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the standard errors (in parenthesis) for
the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained using the Delta Method and are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. (ξ) indicates
that the coefficients for the social interactions terms in the behavioral decisions in Europe and in the United
States are constrained to be equal.
Source: World Values Survey, years 1994-1998 and author’s calculations.
given the small number of regions in the United States and the results could
be biased and inconsistent due to the low variability of the average level of
individual freedom in a region (afavg). Thus, this section differs from the
analysis presented in the previous section in that we constrain the coeffi-
cients for the two behavioral decisions to be equal (i.e. β123 = β124). We
report the results in Table 5.
The results, with the exception of the marginal effects at the mean for
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the two behavioral decisions, are very similar to the results obtained in the
previous part of the analysis, so we do not provide a full description of the
findings. Also, although we imposed a restriction on the two coefficients for
the social interactions terms to be equal, in Table 5 we present the average
partial effects computed at the means, so the estimated impacts differ.
The results show that once again the social interactions terms play a
significant, sizeable and positive role in the determination of individual
freedom of immigrants living either in the United States or in Europe. With
regards to the other variables, most of them have a similar impact on the
two behavioral decisions in the United States and Europe. However, while
immigrants with higher education sorting in a US region are more likely to
be autonomous than individuals with intermediate levels of education, the
same group of immigrants living in a European region is less likely to be
autonomous than immigrants with intermediate levels of education. Also,
while self-employed are more likely to be autonomous than the reference
group in the US, immigrants who are self-employed and live in Europe are
not significantly more autonomous than immigrants in the reference group
and if any effect should exists it would be negative. Although the lack of
significance of the estimated parameter could be due to the small percentage
of self-employed in the sample, this result is in line with the results of the
findings in the previous section and deserves further attention.
5.0.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Once again, we perform a sensitivity analysis (reported in Table 5, Panel
B) as we did for the previous results. The results show that in the location
decision both the social interactions terms and the marginal effect at the
means of the difference in trustworthiness levels are significant at the 10
percent level in the last two scenarios (changes in distributional assump-
tions), but they are not significant in the first two (changes in correlation
assumptions). Also, they become insignificant when we change distribu-
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tional assumptions in the behavioral decisions of immigrants in the United
States. These results can be interpreted as in Table 3. With respect to
the behavioral decision, the results for the difference in trustworthiness of
immigrants in the United States are significant at the 10 percent level for
the first two scenarios, while the results for the social interactions term
remain unchanged in terms of significance for the immigrants in both the
United States and Europe. Overall, the results are consistent with a high
and significant impact of both components of culture and, especially for
the social interactions term, they are always sizeable, highly significant and
robust to sensitivity checks.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of culture, through a social inter-
actions model, on individual autonomy of immigrants sorting either (a) in
economically free versus not economically free economies or (b) in economies
that are classified as fully politically free versus not fully politically free or
(c) in Europe or the United States.
The results show that, overall, immigrants are very influenced by their
expectations about the average level of individual freedom present in the
region that hosts them. This is a very important result because it indicates
that immigrants joining “virtuous” regions, where individuals have high
levels of autonomy and consequently higher aggregate levels of self-esteem
and productivity, are more likely to imitate this virtuous behavior; instead,
immigrants joining less virtuous regions are more likely to adapt to this
average behavior and this may lead to persistent differences in productivity
between virtuous and less virtuous regions.
The results also indicate that the difference in trustworthiness has an
impact on immigrants’ decisions in all the estimation results, but it may
sometimes be not significant.
Furthermore, the results also indicate that some crucial individual char-
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acteristics have a different impact across different samples. Indeed, females
are likely to be significantly less autonomous than males in countries that
are either not economically free or not fully politically free. Also, immi-
grants with higher education levels are more likely to be more autonomous
than immigrants with intermediate levels of education in countries that are
economically free (this is true also for countries that are not economically
free, but the estimated parameter is significant only at the 10 percent). A
similar result emerges for immigrants sorting in the US or Europe. Indeed,
comparing the behavioral choice in Europe and in the United States, im-
migrants with university or higher education experience higher autonomy
levels than individuals with lower levels of education in the United States;
however, they are significantly less autonomous than individuals with sec-
ondary education in Europe. This could suggest a lower capacity of the
European labor market to absorb highly skilled workers compared to the
US market. Finally, immigrants that are self-employed are more likely to be
significantly more free in countries with better political status (i.e. countries
that are fully politically free). This is true also for immigrants sorting in the
US or Europe: Self-employed are not likely to be more autonomous than
the reference group in Europe but this is not the case in the United States,
where self-employed are significantly more likely to be autonomous than the
reference group: this result may indicate that entrepreneurs are more likely
to be free to act in the United States than in Europe. This is a very im-
portant result because, as already remarked by the previous literature (e.g.
Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2004; Beugelsdijk, 2007), entrepreneurship
has a positive and significant impact on economic productivity and growth.
It also suggests that entrepreneurship may be linked to institutional and
economical efficiency and that immigrants are better off in countries that
enjoy higher freedom, suggesting also a link between subjective measures of
individual freedom and objective measures of political and economic free-
doms.
Both these results together suggest that behavioral cultural decisions
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may depend upon institutional quality and that culture and institutions
may influence each other and have an impact on the formation of individual
beliefs and decisions.
Our findings are robust to a sensitivity analysis.
In sum, all in all, the findings of this paper indicate that individuals are
very influenced by (expectations about) the overall culture of the region they
join in the formation of their own individual beliefs and decisions. Also,
countries with better institutional environments seem to be more able to
welcome immigrants, while some categories of immigrants may be worse
off in countries and regions with worse institutions. These results deserve
further investigation, which is left for future work.
Finally, expectations turn out to be very important in the determination
of individual beliefs and decisions. Thus, being the model an observational
learning model, changes in expectations or in individual or contextual effects
may lead to substantial socioeconomic changes.
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A Appendix
Variable Definition Source
age age of respondent (r henceforth) World Values Survey
(WVS)
age2 age of r squared WVS
female dummy variable taking value 1 if r is female,
0 otherwise
WVS
eduL dummy variable taking value 1 if r has lower
(i.e. -inadequately- completed elementary ed-
ucation) levels of education, 0 otherwise
WVS
eduH dummy variable taking value 1 if r has higher
education levels or more, 0 otherwise
WVS
educavg regional average education WVS
married dummy variable taking value 1 if r is married,
0 otherwise
WVS
single dummy variable taking value 1 if r is single, 0
otherwise
WVS
ft dummy variable taking value 1 if r works full-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS
pt dummy variable taking value 1 if r works part-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS
Self-empl dummy variable taking value 1 if r is self-
employed, 0 otherwise
WVS
dtr difference in trustworthiness between host re-
gion and home area computed as average trust
of the host region less the average trust of im-
migrants coming from the same home area
WVS
afavg regional average trust of all the r living in a
region
WVS
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